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Information Disclosure and Competent Authority: A Proposal
by Gregory J. Degulis*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the perils involved in international business is the possibility of
double taxation by two taxing jurisdictions. A plausible method to
combat double taxation is through efficient tax planning via access to
information concerning the mechanics of tax treaty implementation be-
tween the United States and its treaty partners. This information may be
restricted, however, so the tax planner must refer to existing resources.
In the domestic context, the tax planner may refer to a variety of sources
of authority to determine how to structure a particular transaction. The
primary sources include the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), Treasury reg-
ulations I and the case law,2 supplemented by IRS administrative law
such as revenue rulings,' revenue procedures,4 private letter rulings, 5
General Counsel Memoranda (GCM), 6 Action on Decisions (AOD)7 and
* J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University (1985).
1 The Treasury Secretary shall proscribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement
of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 301. 7805-1 (1982).
2 The Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) and Treasury Regulations are regularly interpreted in
the U.S. Federal Courts, the Tax Court and the Court of Claims.
3 A Revenue Ruling is an official interpretation of the I.R.C. in the Internal Revenue Bulletin
(I.R.B.). Revenue Rulings are issued only by the national office and are published for the informa-
tion and guidance of taxpayers, IRS officials and others concerned. TREAS. REG.
§ 601.601(d)(2)(i)(A) (1982). The IRS also states that in order to prevent unwarranted invasions of
personal privacy and to comply with statutory provisions dealing with disclosure of information
from the public, I.R.C. § 7213 (1982), the IRS will delete identifying details, including the names of
persons involved, and information of a confidential nature from the ruling. TREAS. REG.
§ 601.601(d)(2)(v)(B) (1982).
4 A Revenue Procedure is a statement of procedure that affects the rights or duties of taxpayers
or other members of the public under the I.R.C. and related statutes, or information that, although
not necessarily affecting the rights and duties of the public, should be a matter of public knowledge.
Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(b).
5 See I.R.C. § 6110 (CCH 1982). A Private Letter Ruling is a written statement issued by the
national office to a taxpayer that interprets and applies tax laws to a specific set of facts. Private
Letter Rulings cannot be used as precedent. I.R.C. § 61100)(3) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 301. 6110-2d
(1982). See also Rev. Proc. 85-1, reprinted in 7 FED. TAXES (P-H) para. 29, 777(1985); Portney,
Letter Rulings An Endangered Species, 26 TAx LAw. 151 (1983); Holden & Novey, Legitimate
Uses of Letter Rulings Issued to Other Taxpayers - A Reply to Gerald Portney, 37 TAx LAw. 1337
(1984).
6 General Counsel Memoranda (GCM) are legal memoranda from the Office of Chief Counsel
to the IRS prepared in response to a formal request for legal advice from the Assistant Commis-
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Technical Memoranda (TM).8 Taken as a whole, this combination of
statutes, regulations and administrative law will be utilized by the tax
professional to ensure that business transactions comply with current
federal tax law and IRS positions.9
In the international context, however, a tax professional's resources
are more limited because U.S. law and IRS administrative releases pro-
vide only half of the applicable authority. The other half, of course, con-
sists of the laws and regulations of the foreign tax jurisdiction which
must be included as a source of tax planning information. Moreover,
beyond the laws of a foreign tax jurisdiction, a tax treaty may be in effect
between the United States and the other country. The tax treaty will, for
example, govern fiscal relations between a U.S. corporation, its interna-
tional subsidiary, the U.S. taxing authority (IRS) and the treaty partner's
taxing authority. 10
Unlike the purely domestic transaction, in which the taxpayer is reg-
ulated by only one government authority (IRS), the international trans-
action has two regulators: the IRS and the treaty partner. Furthermore,
the U.S. taxpayer is not exposed to administrative releases which detail
the foreign taxing authority's position in the tax treaty process. As a
result, the mechanics of tax treaty implementation remain relatively un-
derexposed compared to the IRS' administrative process which is re-
sioner (Technical). The preparation of GCMs involves the research of appropriate statutes, regula-
tions, revenue rulings and case law, as well as previous GCMs and briefs prepared by the Office of
Chief Counsel. Taxation With Representation v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The D.C.
Circuit held that the completed GCMs, even though originally advisory materials, are adopted as a
final statement of agency policy and function as the "working law" of the agency. The court also
concluded, id. at 683, that the completed GCMs are not protected under the "deliberative process"
privilege in exemption five of the Freedom Of Information Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1982).
7 AODs are legal memoranda prepared by attorneys in the Tax Litigation Division and di-
rected to the Chief Counsel whenever the IRS loses a case in the Tax Court, a Federal District
Court, the Court of Claims or the U.S. Court of Appeals. The AOD sets forth the issue which was
decided against the Government, a brief discussion of the fact and the reasons behind a recommen-
dation that the Commissioner acquiesce or nonacquiesce to a decision of the Tax Court or Federal
District Court. Taxation With Representation, 646 F.2d at 672.
8 TMs are memoranda from the Commissioner to the Assistant Secretary of Treasury (Tax
Policy) in connection with the preparation of proposed treasury decisions or regulations. A TM
summarizes or explains the proposed rules, provides background information, states the issues in-
volved, identifies any controversial legal or policy questions, discusses the approach taken by the
draftsperson and gives reasons for that approach. Taxation With Representation, 646 F.2d at 671.
9 The completed Commerce Clearing House Federal Tax Library now includes the I.RC.,
regulations, private letter rulings, and the Internal Revenue Manual. Prentice-Hall publishes Inter-
nal Memoranda of the IRS.
10 Tax treaties are bilateral conventions designed to eliminate double taxation and promote the
free flow of goods between countries. The U.S. currently has 33 tax treaties in effect. See also
Rosenbloom & Langbein, US. Tax Treaty Policy: An Overview, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 359,
360 (1981).
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vealed in publications such as the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM). "
This underexposure, in turn, highlights a void in an international tax
planner's resources.
A fertile source of information pertaining to the respective positions
of tax treaty partners is the treaty mechanism known as competent au-
thority.12 In a competent authority proceeding, representatives of the
treaty partners negotiate a resolution to a double taxation problem aris-
ing under the provisions of the applicable treaty.13 The competent au-
thority negotiations and eventual resolution represent a settlement
between the IRS and a treaty partner regarding taxpayer liability on a
particular issue and set of facts. This settlement is similar to a private
letter ruling in that the taxpayer requests assistance from the IRS. 4
Currently, the only public releases of information on competent author-
ity are two revenue procedures,' 5 statistics on the number of cases ac-
cepted and resolved, 6 and periodic public statements by treasury
officials."7
This Note advocates a systematic release of competent authority de-
terminations, with identifying details' 8 omitted, to provide the interna-
tional tax planner with information concerning tax treaty
implementation. By deleting identifying details such as names, addresses
and tax identification numbers, a competent authority release would vio-
late neither the confidentiality provisions of U.S. tax law' 9 nor treaty se-
crecy clauses.20 Inevitably, the policy considerations surrounding a
competent authority release would cause conflict between the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) policy of disclosure of agency information2'
I" The IRM is a compilation of instructions promulgated by the IRS for the guidance of its
employees when administering tax laws. See Parnell, The Internal Revenue Manual: Its Utility and
Legal Effects, 32 TAx LAW. 687 (1979). See also, Hawkes v. Comm'r, 507 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1974).
12 Competent authority is a tax treaty process designed to resolve disptues arising under the
provisions of the treaty. Each state designates a competent authority who serves as its representative
for interpreting and implementing the treaty. The delegated representatives may consult with each
other, but the treaty does not require the competent authorities to come to an agreement, nor does it
provide any mechanism for binding them to a decision.
13 The treaty provisions are discussed infra notes 34-44.
14 See supra note 5. See also IRC § 6110 (1982).
15 Rev. Proc. 82-29, 1982-1 C.B. 481, superceding Rev. Proc. 70-18, 1970-2 C.B. 493, as ampli-
fied by Rev. Proc. 79-31, 1979-1 C.B. 599; Rev. Proc. 77-16, 1977-1 C.B. 573, as amplified by Rev.
Proc. 79-32, 1979-1 C.B. 599.
16 See infra note 45.
17 McGowan, Competent Authority - An American View, 24 CAN. TAX J. 485 (1976) (com-
ments of Joseph McGowan, Director of International Operations of IRS in 1976).
18 Treas. Reg. § 601.702(b)(2) (1982); Hirschfield, Right of Access to IRS Files, 15 TOL. L.
REv. 659, 665 (1984).
19 I.R.C. § 6103 (1982); See also infra notes 114-16.
20 See infra notes 90-93.
21 Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. 552 (1982)). See Baldrige v.
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and its value to the tax professional on the one hand, and the possibility
of releasing confidential or trade secret information and thereby alienat-
ing tax treaty partners on the other. Through a process of evaluating
policy considerations, this Note will review competent authority history,
describe the current status of FOIA/IRS case law and propose a system-
atic release of competent authority determinations pursuant to a FOIA
request. This release would introduce an element of certainty into the
process of international tax planning and would also further the tax
treaty policy of avoiding double taxation.22
II. REVIEW OF COMPETENT AUTHORITY
Commensurate with an increase in international business activity is
an increase in the opportunity for tax law conflicts amongst the countries
courting international transactions.23 The potential for double taxation
arises from the jurisdictional overlap of two countries on the same items
of income. The overlap results from the fact that most countries exercise
jurisdiction over tax income on two bases, one derived from the source of
the income, the other from the residence of the recipient of that in-
come.24 In general, there are two forms of double taxation: actual25 and
economic. 26 Actual double taxation occurs where two jurisdictions im-
Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345 (1982). The broad mandate of the FOIA is to provide open disclosure of
agency information. Id. at 352; Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project,
454 U.S. 139 (1981); NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 241 (1978); EPA v. Mink, 410
U.S. 73, 80 (1973).
22 The essential long range objectives of the tax treaty program are to eliminate the impedi-
ments that double taxation, or the threat of double taxation might pose to the internationl flow of
goods, capitol and persons, and to establish fiscal relations between the U.S. and others nations.
Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 10, at 405.
23 Goodrich, Canada-United States Tax Accounting-Competent Authority, Section 482 Trans-
fers and Joint Audits, 8 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 95 (1984).
24 Surrey, United Nations Group of Experts and the Guidelines for Tax Treaties Between Devel-
oped and Developing Countries, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 3 (1978). For example, interest received on a
loan made by a lender resident in country A to a borrower in country B could be taxed in country A
on the receipt of interest and also by country B on the payment of interest. Id. The threat of double
taxation may arise either in the context of taxes imposed on permanent establishments (a branch)
which a corporation or other resident of one country has in another country, or in the context of
taxes which are imposed on separate companies which do business in each country and are related in
some manner through stock ownership. Schuster & Fichtenholz, Competent Authority Cases" A
Practical Approach to Relief from Double Taxation, 47 J. TAX'N 288, 290 (1970). See also 1 TAX
TREATIES (CCH) para. 1001.
25 McCawley, Competent Authority Procedure - Rev. Proa 82-29, 82-9 TAx MGMT. INT'L J. 3
(1982). "Where a U.S. corporation conducts business operations in a foreign country through a
branch, the profits of the branch are included in the taxable income and taxed to the corporation. At
the same time, the profits attributable to the operations of the branch are taxed by the foreign juris-
diction." Id.
26 Economic double taxation arises primarily when a U.S. corporation conducts foreign opera-
tions through a subsidiary organized under the laws of another country. Id.
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pose a tax on the same taxpayer with respect to the same items of in-
come. This form of double taxation is relieved primarily through the use
of foreign tax credits which allow the U.S. corporation to obtain relief for
income taxes paid to the foreign jurisdiction.27
Economic double taxation, on the other hand, occurs when the U.S.
and a foreign country each tax distinct entities, but the two entities con-
sidered as an economic unit have been taxed twice on the same income.z8
One of the most common types of economic double taxation stems from
the power of the IRS to allocate gross income, deductions, credits or
allowances between related organizations under section 482.29 For ex-
ample, the IRS may allocate income from a wholly-owned foreign sub-
sidiary to a U.S. parent under section 482 because of an unrealistic
pricing arrangement. The subsidiary has already reported the income
and paid tax to the foreign authority and, as a result of the section 482
allocation, the United States assesses a tax against the parent. Since the
U.S. and foreign tax relate to the same income, there is economic double
taxation.3 °
In response to increasing possibilities of actual and economic double
taxation, the United States and other developed countries have negoti-
ated bilateral tax treaties .3  The reciprocal nature of tax treaties elimi-
nates double taxation through a system of exemptions, reduced rates of
tax and credit provisions which override any conflicting tax laws of the
treaty partners.3 2 To curb the effects of double taxation, the taxing juris-
dictions work out a mutually agreeable set of standards for the ultimate
27 The foreign tax credit and its limitations are covered in I.R.C. §§ 901-908. See also McDon-
nell, Foreign Exchange and the Indirect Foreign Tax Credit, 10 J. CORP. TAX'N 301, 303 (1984).
28 McCawley, supra note 25, at 4.
29 Id. Much of the double taxation is a result of section 482 allocations by the IRS to prevent
tax avoidance or income distortion. Schindler, The Use of Functional Analysis Approach in 482
Cases, 84-5 TAx MGMT. INT'L J. 141 (1984). Section 482 reads as follows:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades or businesses (whether or not incorpo-
rated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned
or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may distribute,
apportion, or allocate gross income deductions, credits or allowances between. . . such
organizations, trades or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment,
or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the in-
come of any such organizations, trades or businesses.
I.RC. § 482 (1982).
30 Oetjen, The Competent Authority's Role in Resolving International Tax Issues, 26 TAx
EXEc. 57, 60 (1973). From 1971 to 1980, about 60% of the competent authority cases arose from
allocations by a treaty partner. INSTrrTrrE ON INTERNATIONAL TAxATION 172 (13th ed. 1982);
Noe, Service Discretion and Burden of Proof in International Tax Cases Involving Section 482, 15
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 203 (1982).
31 As of December 31, 1984, the U.S. has 34 income tax treaties in force. See Goodrich, supra
note 23, at 102.
32 TAx TREATIES, supra note 24, at para. 1001.
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determination of tax liability.33
This set of standards is currently contained in the Mutual Agree-
ment Procedure, usually found in article 25 of U.S. bilateral tax trea-
ties.34 Article 25 entitles a taxpayer who is faced with a situation without
relief from double taxation to ask the U.S. competent authority35 to meet
with the treaty partner's competent authority to negotiate a settlement of
the taxpayer's double taxation case.36 The term "competent authority"
usually refers to the delegated representative of a treaty country who has
plenary power to resolve interpretive and administrative disputes within
the treaty.37 The competent authority's primary responsibility is to con-
sult and negotiate with a treaty partner to properly determine the respec-
tive tax liability in the event of double taxation.3" In this way, the
competent authority procedure provides flexibility in treaty interpreta-
tion without arduous treaty renegotiation.39 If the competent authority
33 MeCawley, supra note 25, at 4.
34 OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND
CAPITAL 19-192 (1977). The Current U.S. model is the Treasury Department's Model Income Tax
Treaty of 1981, reprinted in I TAX TREATIES (CCH) para. 158. Article 25 states in part:
Where a person considers that the actions of one or both of the contracting states results or
will result for him in taxation not in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, he
may irrespective of the remedies provided by the domestic law of those states, present his
case to the Competent Authority of the Contracting States of which he is a resident or a
national.
35 In the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury designated the IRS Commissioner as
competent authority under the tax treaties. T.D. 150-83, 1973-2 C.B. 508. Subsequently, the Com-
missioner delegated the competent authority responsibility to the Associate Commissioner (Opera-
tions), and Director, Foreign Operations District. Del. Ord. 114 (Rev. 4), 1985-15 I.R.B. 9,
superceding Del. Ord. 114 (Rev. 3), 1981-1 C.B. 341. The Associate Commissioner (Operations)
possesses broad authority for administrating tax treaties & specific exchanges of information. IN-
TERNAL REVENUE SERVICE MANUAL 42(10)(10) 2(a)(b). The Associate Commissioner (Opera-
tions) is the U.S. competent authority. IRM DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION HANDBOOK 25(10(4).
36 See 1981 Model Treaty supra note 34, at art. 25(2). See also Schuster & Fichtenholz, supra
note 24, at 289.
37 See Comment, The Competent Authority Concept in U.S. Tax Treaties, LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 233, 235 n.16 (1970). The term competent authority first appeared in a tax treaty with Sweden
in 1939. Convention and Protocol with Sweden Respecting Double Taxation, Mar. 23, 1939, United
States-Sweden, 54 Stat. 1759, T.S. No. 858. The 1939 Convention contained several administrative
functions for the competent authority including rulemaking power, exchange of information and
resolution of double taxation claims. Comment, supra, at 236 n.16.
38 1981 Model Treaty, supra note 34, at art. 25(3). The competent authorities of the con-
tracting states are to resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts arising as to the interpre-
tation or application of the Convention.
39 The new Canada-United States tax treaty, for example, was signed on September 26, 1980,
and then amended by protocols on June 14, 1983 and March 28, 1984. The treaty and protocols
were ratified by the U.S. Senate on June 28, 1984 and the instruments of ratification were exchanged
on August 16, 1984, thereby entering into force that day. 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) para. 1202(1); see
also Brown, Canada-United States Tax Issues The Tax Treaty, Unitary Taxation and the Future, 32
CAN. TAX J. 547 (1984); See also Borraccia Canadian Tax Audits of Multinational Corporations, 37
TAx. EXEC. 117 (1985).
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decides to accept the case,4° the competent authority will negotiate with
the treaty partner's representative in order to reach a satisfactory solu-
tion in accordance with the terms of the treaty.41 During negotiations,
the competent authorities exchange information pursuant to tax treaty
provisions,42 and eventually reach a partial or full solution to the double
taxation. The U.S. competent authority will then notify the taxpayer of
any agreement reached between the two treaty countries with respect to
the request for assistance. 43 In addition, under Revenue Procedure 82-
29, 4 the taxpayer will be requested to enter into a closing agreement
reflecting the terms of the competent authority agreement. The IRS, as
the U.S. competent authority, releases only statistical compilations45 of
competent authority requests and reveals other information relating to
the program through sporadic public statements by IRS officials.46
III. RECENT COMPETENT AUTHORITY HISTORY
Prior to 1970, the most prevalent type of relief for double taxation
was unilateral action by the United States in favor of the taxpayer. In a
1971 corporate survey, 127 out of 271 companies indicated that IRC sec-
tion 482 allocations resulted in double taxation and only 41 of the doubly
taxed companies reported recovery of the full amount doubly taxed.47
These 127 companies were denied recovery from the foreign govern-
ments,48 forcing the companies to recover unilaterally from the U.S.
Treasury under the provisions of Revenue Procedure 65-54.49 Revenue
40 The competent authority may decline to assist the taxpayer if double taxation does not exist,
the taxpayer is unwilling to accept a competent authority agreement or procedures, or the taxpayer
does not furnish sufficient information. Rev. Proc. 82-29, supra note 15, at § 9.01; Rev. Proc. 77-16,
supra note 15.
41 1981 Model Treaty, supra note 34, at art. 25(2).
42 1981 Model Treaty, supra note 34, at art. 26. Article 26 states in part: "The Competent
Authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange information as is necessary for carrying out the
provisions of the Convention or of the domestic laws of the Contracting States concerning taxes
covered by the Convention insofar as the taxpayer thereunder is not contrary to the Convention."
See also Reiner, How the IRS Exchanges Information with Other Countries, 31 TAx ExEc. 305
(1979); Caribbean Basin Initiative, TAx NoTES, Mar. 22, 1982, at 776.
43 Rev. Proc. 82-29, supra note 15, at § 9.04; Rev. Proc. 77-16, supra note 15, at § 6.04.
44 The terms of the closing agreement must be in accordance with sections 6.07 and 6.17 of
Rev. Proc. 68-16, 1968-1 C.B. 770.
45 See Goodrich, supra note 23, at 112-14 app. The competent authority case statistics include
categories such as total cases received, disposed of, inventory and average duration.
46 McGowan, Evolution of the U.S. Competent Authority Program in N.Y.U. INST. ON INT'L
TAx & Bus. PLAN., 1977. Tax Treaties and Competent Authority, 281 (1978).
47 King, Economic Double Taxation Under Section 482-Type Statutes" Competent Authority
Procedures Under Tax Treaties- Possible Initiatives for Avoiding Double Taxation in Non-Treaty
Situations, 1976 TAx. MGMT. INT'L J. 9, 11.
48 Id. at 11.
49 Rev. Proc. 65-54, 1964-2 C.B. 1008, clarified by Rev. Rul. 65-109, 1965-1 C.B. 222 & Rev.
1985]
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Procedure 65-54 allowed only unilateral relief for section 482 allocations
and also granted the companies a substantial grace period in which to
alter related party transactions."' Although the U.S. bilateral tax treaties
provided for competent authority relief, the pre-1970 procedure was
deemed inadequate because of no uniform revenue procedure, the unpre-
dictable treatment of international tax, and the inconsistent competent
authority policy due to fragmentation of authority 1
In 1970, the IRS released Revenue Procedure 70-1852 which pro-
vided uniform bilateral tax relief through competent authority proce-
dures. This Revenue Procedure detailed avenues a U.S. taxpayer should
follow to invoke competent authority to avoid double taxation. 3 Reve-
nue Procedure 70-18 instructed the taxpayer on the procedures to follow
if either the U.S. or the treaty partner's actions resulted in double taxa-
tion. 4 Section five 55 of the revenue procedure also outlined specific
pieces of information that the taxpayer must supply to the competent
authority and, for the first time, raised questions about the treatment of
that information. 6 Although Revenue Procedure 70-18 responded to
pleas for an IRS statement on tax treaty relief, competent authority pro-
cedures were used sparingly until Revenue Ruling 76-508.1'
Revenue Ruling 76-508, often referred to as the mandatory compe-
tent authority ruling, forced the taxpayer to exhaust all effective remedies
including competent authority, or face the possible loss of foreign tax
Rul. 68-549, 1968-2 C.B. 202, amplified by Rev. Proc. 65-32, 1965-1 C.B. 493, extended by Rev.
Proc. 66-33, 1966-2 C.B. 1231.
50 Rev. Proc. 65-54, a procedure no longer in effect, permitted a company to offset U.S. tax to
compensate for double taxation caused by allocations under section 482. Rev. Proc. 65-54, 1965-1
C.B. 1008.
51 See Comment, supra note 37, at 238. The author noted that the competent authority cases
were handled on a treaty by treaty basis and that functions of the competent authority were exer-
cised by three officers within the IRS: Office of Chief Counsel, Office of Assistant Commissioner
(Technical), and the Office of International Operations. Id. at 237, 238.
52 Rev. Proc. 70-18, 1970-2 C.B. 493, amplified by Rev. Proc. 79-31, 1979-1 C.B. 599.
53 For a review of Revenue Procedure 70-18, see O'Donnell, A provisional analysis ofRev. Proc.
70-18 Many questions remain, 35 J. TAX'N 12 (1971). See also Cole, Competent Authority Proce-
dure: International Tax Counsel Gives his Views, 35 J. TAX'N 8 (1971). For a comparative analysis,
see Eiker, Competent Authority: At Home and Abroad, 5 INT'L TAX J. 198 (1979).
54 Rev. Proc. 70-18, §§ 5, 7, 1970-2 C.B. at 496-98.
55 Rev. Proc. 70-18, § 5, 1970-2 C.B. at 496-97. See Comment, supra note 37, at 248.
56 From 1970 to 1977, there were approximately 222 requests for competent authority relief.
See McGowan, supra note 46, at 281. Another reason for the reluctance of the U.S. taxpayer to
invoke competent authority assistance was due to the relatively primitive stage of tax laws in most
other countries. McCawley, supra note 25, at 7.
57 Rev. Rul. 76-508, 1976-2 C.B. 225, amplified by Rev. Rul. 80-231, 1980-2 C.B. 219. Some of
the reasons cited for the relatively few requests are: lack of confidence; time restraints; statutes of
limitation; fear of foreign government retaliation; and reluctance to disclose profits involved in the
transfer of technical advice. See McGowan, supra note 51, at 294 (comments of Mr. Burleson).
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credit. 8 The foreign tax credit provision spurred interest in the use of
competent authority. 59 In 1977, the IRS released Revenue Procedure 77-
1660 which prescribed procedures for competent authority assistance in
order to resolve conflicts involving foreign tax credits, exemptions and
reduced rates of tax under a bilateral tax treaty.6' Revenue Procedure
77-16 was designed to supplement Revenue Procedure 70-18 which dealt
exclusively with allocations of income and deductions by either the treaty
country or the IRS.62 Section four of Revenue Procedure 77-16 revealed
the breadth of information to be submitted to the competent authority,
including the type of income involved,63 descriptions of transactions in
the treaty country, issues raised by the positions taken by the treaty
country and copies of any correspondence from the treaty country.r
4
In 1982, the IRS released Revenue Procedure 82-2965 which is the
taxpayer's current guide to invoking competent authority in the event of
allocations by either the treaty country or the IRS. Revenue Procedure
82-29 applies to allocations of income and deduction between a U.S. tax-
payer and a related person subject to the taxing jurisdiction of a country
that has entered into an income tax treaty with the United States66 If the
taxpayer seeks relief under Revenue Procedure 82-29, it is imperative
that the taxpayer cooperate fully with the competent authority's request
for tax related information.67
Mandatory information gathering by the taxpayer is the central
source of domestic competent authority documentation and is used pri-
marily by the U.S. competent authority in negotiating the taxpayer's
case. 68 One commentator describes the role of the competent authority
as an arbitrator attempting to represent the U.S. government and the
58 If the taxpayer does not exhaust all remedies, then any overpayment to the treaty country is
presumed to be a voluntary contribution and, therefore, is not included in the deemed foreign tax
credit. See Rev. Rul. 76-508, supra note 57; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(5)(i).
59 There was a significant increase in the average number of allocations submitted after 1977,
apparently because of Revenue Ruling 76-508. See INSTITUTE ON INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 172
(13th ed. 1982).
60 Rev. Proc. 77-16, 1977-1 C.B. 573.
61 Id. § 1, 1977-1 C.B. at 573-74.
62 Id.; see Rev. Proc. 70-18, supra note 52.
63 Rev. Proc. 77-16, § 4.04(4), 1977-1 C.B. at 575. Examples include salaries or dividends,
additional information such as the amount of treaty country tax originally paid or reported by the
taxpayer, and the amount of the particular item involved in the issues raised by the treaty country.
Id § 4.04(4), (5), 1977-1 C.B. at 575.
6 Id.
65 Rev. Proc. 82-29, supra note 15.
66 Id. § 1, 1982-1 C.B. at 481.
67 The U.S. taxpayer has an interest in placing the U.S. competent authority in a position
where he can agree to yield U.S. tax priority as judged by U.S. standards of evidence and theory. See
McCawley, supra note 25, at 3, 6.
68 Id.
1985]
CASE W. RES. J INT'L LV.
U.S. taxpayer in seeking relief from double taxation.69 The international
source of competent authority information, on the other hand, stems
from the active exchange of information programs delineated under U.S.
bilateral tax treaties. 7° Together, the taxpayer's domestic information
and the information from the treaty partner comprise the bulk of a com-
petent authority file. As this information may be subject to a FOIA re-
quest, it is necessary to examine each source of competent authority
information.
IV. OBLIGATIONS OF THE U.S. TAXPAYER
One of the central conditions and concerns of a taxpayer invoking
competent authority relief is full disclosure of relevant information.71
The processes and protections of information submitted to the U.S. com-
petent authority are of concern to the taxpayer,72 especially when the
taxpayer is a multinational corporation which has submitted sensitive in-
tercompany pricing information. The taxpayer must fully cooperate with
the U.S. competent authority or face the possibility of a denial of compe-
tent authority assistance, thus foregoing any tax treaty relief from double
taxation. Section 9.0 of Revenue Procedure 82-29 states in part: "[T]he
United States competent authority will not assist the taxpayer if. . .(d)
the taxpayer does not furnish, upon request, sufficient information to de-
termine whether the treaty applies to the taxpayer's facts and circum-
stances, or the taxpayer otherwise fails to act as required by this
procedure . . . ., In addition, the taxpayer is requested to supply any
additional information needed to resolve the case and keep the U.S. com-
petent authority informed about proceedings in the treaty country.74
The taxpayer must also sign a separate statement consenting to disclo-
sure to the competent authority of the treaty country.7" Failure to follow
these provisions for information dissemination, however, will not prevent
the U.S. competent authority from disclosing information under the
69 Goodrich, Canada-U.S. Tax Accounting: Competent Authority, Section 482 Transfers and
Joint Audits, 4 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 151, 156 (1981).
70 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
71 Rev. Proc. 82-29, §§ 4.04, 5.07, 1982-1 C.B. at 482, 483-84.
72 The major concern is the perceived fear of retaliation by government representatives when
sensitive information is released (pursuant to a request of the competent authority) that might other-
wise remain undisclosed. Liebman, Review Article: Current Trends in Bilateral Tax Treaties, 13 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 367, 375 (1979). See Tax Treaties and Competent Authority, supra note 46, at
294. People were concerned about the amount of information that would be submitted when the
competent authority was invoked and about how the information would be handled by the other
contracting states. Id.
73 Rev. Proc. 82-29, § 9.01, 1982-1 C.B. at 484-85.
74 Id. § 9.02, 1982-1 C.B. at 485.
75 Id. § 4.04, 1982-1 C.B. at 482.
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terms of the tax treaty.76 As a result, the taxpayer gains no advantage
from withholding information from the competent authority. Under In-
ternal Revenue Code section 6103(k)(4), tax return information"7 may be
disclosed to a foreign competent authority pursuant to an exchange of
information agreement, regardless of the taxpayer's consent.78
Specifically, under Revenue Procedure 82-29, the taxpayer must
submit the following information to the U.S. competent authority:
names, addresses and U.S. taxpayer identification numbers and related
persons involved,79 description and control of business relationship be-
tween the U.S. taxpayer and related persons,8' copies of foreign tax re-
turns and the proposed allocations of the foreign country81 and copies of
all correspondence, briefs and other relevant material pertaining to the
treaty country.82 This compilation of data is especially helpful to the
competent authority where the facts are complex and multiple adjust-
ments have been proposed.83 The taxpayer is excluded from the govern-
ment-to-government competent authority negotiations, but the process of
information gathering by the taxpayer ensures that the U.S. competent
authority is fully briefed.84
V. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION UNDER TAx TREATIES
The second major source of competent authority materials is the
exchange of information through tax treaties. The recently ratified Can-
ada-U.S. Tax Treaty states in part that "The Competent Authorities of
the Contracting States shall exchange such information as is necessary
for carrying out the provisions of this Convention or of the domestic laws
of the Contracting States concerning taxes covered by this Convention
insofar as the taxation thereunder is not contrary to the Convention."8 5
Another important provision to those who request competent authority
is found in the second portion of article XXVII of the Convention: "In-
76 Id.
77 Returns and return information are discussed fully in section VI(b) of the text.
78 See Rev. Proc. 82-29, § 4.04(1), 1982-1 C.B. at 482.
79 Id. § 4.04(b).
80 Id. § 4.04(e).
81 Id. § 4.04(h).
82 Id. § 4.04(i). A summary of the contents of the relief request for foreign allocations is con-
tained in Ruchelman & Imamura, Intercompany Transfer Pricing Including Tax Treaty Relief, 1984
INsT. ON FED. TAX'N at 35-32.
83 McCawley, supra note 25, at 6.
84 Id. McCawley suggests that "the core of the information disclosure requirements is the
furnishing of a statement of actions taken by, or proposed by, the competent authority of the treaty
country because it keeps the U.S. competent authority abreast of treaty developments. It
85 Convention Between the United States of America and Canada With Respect to Taxes On
Income and Capital, art. XXVII, reprinted in 1 TAx TREATIES para. 1317K (Sept. 26, 1980) [herein-
after cited as Canada-U.S. Tax Treaty].
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formation received by a Contracting State shall be treated as secret in the
same manner as information obtained under the taxation laws of the
State."9
8 6
Initially, it is necessary to consider the types of information ex-
changes practiced by the IRS. The two primary methods of exchange are
known as "routine" and "specific" requests for information.8 7 The U.S.
competent authority often conducts specific requests for information
through the Simultaneous Examination Program,", which allows the
treaty countries to commence simultaneous examinations of multina-
tional companies operating within both countries. Currently, the United
States maintains a Simultaneous Examination Program with five treaty
countries.8 9 The United States also participates in a Multilateral Simul-
taneous Exchange Program which allows the competent authorities of
several countries to simultaneously examine a single taxpayer. 90
86 As a result, information supplied by the U.S. taxpayer pursuant to Revenue Procedures 77-
16 or 82-29 potentially may end up in the hands of foreign tax authorities subject to the secrecy laws
of that state. See Toope & Young, The Confidentiality of Tax Returns Under Canadian Law, 27
MCGILL L.J. 479 (1982). The secrecy provisions and IRS extraterritorial summons power has gen-
erated recent legal writings. Recent Development, Taxation: Summons to Secure Business Records
of Foreign Subsidiary - United States v. Vetco, 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1981), 22 HARV. INT'L L.J.
704 (1981); Recent cases, Foreign Illegality: No Absolute Bar to Enforcement of Internal Revenue
Service Summons, 14 LAw AM. 79 (1982).
87 The most prevalent exchanges are known as "routine exchanges" which cover information
regarding passive income. In 1982, the IRS provided treaty partners with approximately 500,000
documents and received approximately 800,000 documents. Canada supplies over 90% of the for-
eign documents. The exchanges involve: 1) Information dealing with U.S. source income sent to the
treaty partner (except the Soviet Union) where the alien claims residence; 2) U.S. information taken
from the information returns filed by U.S. withholding agents and run through a computer; 3) Each
treaty partner is furnished with a copy of the computer printout summarizing information relating to
that country. Goodrich, supra note 23, at 103. During 1978, for example, the United States fur-
nished to its treaty partners some 425,000 pieces of information concerning passive income. Reiner,
supra note 42, at 306. The "specific exchanges", on the other hand, usually contain information
such as the control of companies, any legal or financial documents and must specifically identify the
item or expense of the requesting country. Id. at 306. Competent authority information relating to a
particular taxpayer is most likely to stem from a specific request. For specific requests the United
States seems to have received no more than two hundred requests per year, a smaller number consid-
ering the large mass of international transactions. Seeman, Exchange of Information Under Interna-
tional Tax Conventions, 17 INT'L L. 333, 338 (1983). If a treaty partner requests information
contained in U.S. files, the taxpayer will not be notified that such information was disclosed. The
taxpayer will be notified, however, if the IRS believes the information to constitute a trade, business,
commercial or professional secret or trade process. The IRS will also notify a taxpayer of the treaty
partner request if the information is not in IRS files or the taxpayer is not currently being examined
by the IRS. Goodrich, supra, at 103. See Note, Exchange of Information Under the OECD and U.S.
Model Tax Treaties, 5 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 129, 133 (1982).
88 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE MANUAL 43(10)(10).5(2). During the examination, infor-
mation is exchanged in accordance with the treaty between the two nations. See Goodrich, supra
note 23, at 102.
89 Canada, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, France and Norway.
90 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE MANUAL, 42 (10)(10.7)(5). The United States, however, will
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Within the IRC, section 6103(k)(4) states that return information
may be disclosed to the competent authority of a foreign government
according to the terms of the convention.91 The information exchanged
is protected from disclosure by secrecy provisions of the treaty which
provide for nondisclosure of any trade, business, industrial, commercial,
or professional secret or process. 92 In general, the IRS cannot disclose
such information to anyone but those concerned with the assessment,
collection, enforcement or prosecution. 93 These records, due to the com-
plexity and sensitivity of disclosure relating to records of contact with a
foreign government, 94 are subject to an initial determination of release to
others by the authority of the Director, Foreign Operations District.95
If the Foreign Operations Director (or his delegate) decided after an
initial determination that the records are not suitable to be released, then
the taxpayer may initiate an administrative appeal procedure within
thirty-five days.96 Once a determination of whether to release records is
made by the IRS, this administrative decision will be overturned on judi-
cial review only if the decision to withhold meets the arbitrary or capri-
cious standard of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 97 This
arbitrary and capricious standard, in contrast with the FOIA, provides
the IRS with wide discretion in deciding whether to withhold records.
For one who seeks access to such information, the FOIA,98 and its policy
favoring disclosure of agency information, and IRC section 61039 pro-
not provide information received from one treaty partner to another since this generally would vio-
late the secrecy provisions of the income tax treaty with the treaty partner from whom the informa-
tion was received. I at § 5(c). Each participating country must have a tax treaty authorizing
exchange of information with the other countries. See Goodrich, supra note 23, at 105.
91 I.R.C. § 6103(k)(4) (1982) states in part: A return or return information may be disclosed to
a competent authority of a foreign government which has an income tax or estate and gift tax con-
vention, or other convention relating to the exchange of information.
92 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE MANUAL 42 (10)(10.5)(4).
93 See Canada-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 85, at art. XXVII:
[This information] shall be disclosed only to those persons or authorities (including courts
and administrative bodies) involved in the assessment or collection of, the administration
and enforcement in respect of, or the determination of appeals in relation to, the taxes
covered by the Convention. Such persons or authorities shall use the information only for
such purposes.
94 IRM DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION HANDBOOK, supra note 35, at (13)46.
95 Treas. Reg. § 601.702(c)(7)(i) (1984) provides that: "The Chief of Disclosure Operations
shall have authority to make initial determination with respect to requests for records of the IRS
unless the records are controlled by the Foreign Operations District."
96 Id. at 601.702(c)(7)(iii).
97 5 U.S.C. § 706(b)(2)(A) (1982). "The reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or
otherwise not in accordance with law." Id.
98 See supra note 21.
99 I.R.C. § 61 10(b)(1) (1982). Section 6110 defines written determinations to include "rulings,
determination letters and technical advice memorandum." Id.
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vide the best opportunity to obtain such competent authority informa-
tion. Through the FOIA and section 6103, competent authority
determinations should be released with identifying details deleted.
VI. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
The FOIA was designed to encourage open disclosure of informa-
tion in the possession of government agencies."°° The FOIA is the statu-
tory mechanism through which the broadest range of information may
be obtained from the IRS.101  Subject to statutory exemptions, 10 2 the
FOIA requires an agency to make requested records promptly available
to any person who follows certain prescribed procedural rules.10 3 To
supplement the general policy of disclosure, the FOIA requires agency
adherence to procedural rules"0 4 to accelerate the processing of requests
at the agency level and mandates strict judicial review of agency refusals
to release information. 105 Subject to relatively minor jurisdictional obsta-
cles, 106 a U.S. District Court may enjoin the IRS from withholding
agency records and order the production of any agency records improp-
erly withheld from the requesting party. 107 The district court shall re-
view a denial de novo, and may examine the contents of such records to
determine whether the records should be withheld under any FOIA ex-
100 Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345 (1982); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); Department of
the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
101 Seigel & Langbein, Extracting Documents and Information From the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, 12 CuM.-SAM. L. Rv. 303, 304 (1982).
102 The relevant exemptions are found at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) and are discussed fully infra note
110.
103 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1982). The procedural rules require that the person requesting infor-
mation reasonably describe such records and comply with rules stating the time, place, fees (if any)
and other procedures to be followed. Id. An exhibit of a proper FOIA request for IRS records is
contained in Jensen, The Freedom of Information Act, 6 REV. TAX IND. 136, 137 (1982). The re-
quest must be in writing, signed and made pursuant to the FOIA. Id. The Treasury regulations
specify the form of the request for IRS records in section 601.702(c)(1). See Church of Scientology
v. IRS, 561 F.2d 1165 (D.D.C. 1983) (an actionable request under FOIA for records in possession of
the IRS is defined under 26 C.F.R. § 601.702(c)(1) as one which conforms in every aspect with the
rules and procedures set forth in this subpart).
104 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1982). Each agency must determine within ten days after re-
ceipt of such requests whether to comply and shall immediately notify the person of the agency
determination and the reasons thereof.
105 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(B) (1982). If denied, the person requesting information may seek
an administrative appeal and the IRS must make such a determination within 20 days. Id.
§ 552(a)(6)(A)(ii). If, on administrative appeal, the denial is upheld in whole or in part, the IRS
shall notify the person of the provision governing judicial review.
106 The district court in the district in which the claimant resides, or has a principal place of
business, or in which agency records are located, or the District Court of the District of Columbia. 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982).
107 Id
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emptions.10 8 Most importantly, the FOIA shifts the burden of proof
from the individual requesting the information to the agency to sustain
its decision to withhold information. 09 The IRS can meet its statutory
burden of proof only by showing that the information sought is within
one of the nine exemptions specified in the FOIA. 10
A. Exemption Three
Exemption three of the FOIA allows agency non-disclosure of re-
quested information only if the materials are exempted by a statute
which meets one of the following two tests: 1) the statute requires the
matters to be withheld in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the
issue, or 2) the statute establishes particular criteria for withholding in-
formation.11 Exemption three is considered in detail because of the con-
siderable uncertainty as to the working relationship between the FOIA
and section 6103.1 This uncertainty has produced substantial case law
on the limits of the IRS' ability to keep tax documentation confidential.
Within the IRC, section 6103 is generally considered to be a statute
which meets the exemption three tests, thus allowing the IRS to withhold
information from a FOIA requester.'1 3 Section 6103 states the general
rule that tax "return" and tax "return information" are confidential and
should not be disclosed. 1 4 In the competent authority context, two is-
sues must be examined in relation to section 6103: 1) whether, according
to case law, competent authority materials fit within the scope of pro-
108 Id § 552(b).
109 Id. § 552(a)(4)(3) (1982). See, eg., Seafarers International Union v. Baldovin, 508 F.2d
125 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 511 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1975); Flower v. Federal
Bureau of Investigation, 448 F.Supp. 567 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
110 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1-9) (1982).
I11 Id § 552(b)(3).
112 See infra notes 113, 114.
113 I.R.C. § 6103(a) (1982).
114 I.R.C. § 6103(a) states:
(a) General Rule.-Returns and return information shall be confidential, and except as
authorized by this title-
(1) no officer or employee of the United States,
(2) no officer or employee of any State or of any local child support enforcement
agency who has or had access to returns or return information under this section, and
(3) no other person (or officer or employee thereof) who has access to returns or return
information under [this section], shall disclose any return or return information obtained
by him in any manner in connection with his service as such an officer or an employee or
other wise or under the provisions of this section. For purposes of this subsection, the term
"officer or employee" includes a former officer or employee.
Section 6103 is Congress' attempt to strike a proper balance between a citizen's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy and the government's need for return information in implementing effective tax ad-
ministration. See S. REP. No. 938 (Part. 1), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 317-18 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3439, 3747; Bittker, Federal Income Tax Returns - Confidentiality v.
Disclosure, 20 WASHBURN L.. 479 (1981).
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tected return information, and 2) whether section 6103 is the sole stan-
dard of review governing judicial review of an IRS denial of disclosure.
B. Return Information
In general, tax "return information" is defined quite broadly to en-
sure the maximum protection of information received by the IRS. 11 Tax
return information is defined as a taxpayer's identity, the nature, source
or amount of income or any other data received by, prepared by, or col-
lected by the Secretary with respect to the determination of tax liabil-
ity.1 16 There is, however, a rather narrowing caveat included at the end
of the statute which states that return information does not include data
in a form which cannot be associated with, or otherwise identified, di-
rectly or indirectly, with a particular taxpayer.1 17 This narrowing con-
struction of return information is known as the Haskell Amendment,
named after the Senator who proposed this change in section 6103 in the
Tax Reform Act of 1976.11s The Haskell Amendment is at the core of
interpretive variations within the different circuits and would most likely
determine whether competent authority files qualify as "return informa-
tion" within section 6103(b)(2).1 19
Currently, there is no direct authority on whether information pos-
sessed by the competent authority, either domestic or international, is
considered tax "return information." Therefore, it is necessary to review
the materials submitted to the competent authority and reconcile these
materials with the case law boundaries of "return information." Accord-
ing to Revenue Procedures 77-16120 and 82-29,121 the taxpayer must sub-
mit a description of the control and business relationships between
related persons, 122 a statement of the status of tax liability of the related
persons in the treaty country for the years of adjustment1 23 and copies of
pertinent correspondence, briefs, protests and other relevant material
from the treaty country. 124 The U.S. competent authority may also re-
115 I.R.C. § 6103(v)(2) (1982). Section 6103 is concerned foremost with protecting tax returns
and information directly related thereto. Fruehauf Corp. v. IRS, 566 F.2d 574, 579 (6th Cir. 1977).
116 I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2) (1982).
117 Id.
118 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-555, § 1202(a)(1), 90 Stat. 1520, 1667 (1976)
(codified at 26 U.S.C. 6103(b)(2) (1982)). Senator Haskell commented: "The purpose of the amend-
ment is to ensure that statistical studies and other compilations of data now prepared by the IRS and
disclosed by it to outside parties will continue to be subject to disclosure to the extent allowed under
present law." 122 CONG. Rac. S24012 (1976).
119 The Haskell Amendment is discussed supra note 118 & infra notes 136-140.
120 Rev. Proc. 77-16, supra note 15, at § 6.
121 Rev. Proc. 82-29, supra note 15, at § 4.
122 Id. § 4.04(e).
123 Id. § 4.04(0.
124 Id. § 4.04(i).
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ceive information about the taxpayer's case from the treaty country
which is subject to the secrecy clauses of the convention. 125 Along with
trade or commercial secrets,126 information received by the U.S. compe-
tent authority from a treaty partner is subject to the secrecy laws of the
United States127 which, in this case, are codified in section 6103.
This Note seeks to outline the breadth of "return information" in
order to show that current case law would support a release of competent
authority without violating section 6103. In regard to the boundaries of
return information, case law is split into two camps, the IRS position and
the Ninth Circuit position. The IRS view of return information
originated in Zale Corp. v. IRS'28 in 1979 and has received support as
recently as December 1984 in the District of Columbia Federal District
Court.12 9 The most extensive discussion of the IRS position, however, is
contained in the Seventh Circuit decision, King v. IRS.130 In King, the
taxpayer utilized a FOIA request to obtain data, memoranda and back-
ground information relating to or commenting on certain revenue rulings
and regulations issued by the IRS. 3' The IRS declined to disclose eight
documents132 on the grounds that the documents constituted return in-
formation under section 6103. The King court, relying on the comments
of Senator Haskell, 3 3 held that the return information protects from dis-
closure all nonamalgamated items and that the Haskell Amendment pro-
vides only for disclosure of statutory compilations which are not
associated with or do not identify a taxpayer.134 In a broad reading of
section 6103 the Seventh Circuit held that only statistical studies which
do not identify a particular taxpayer may be released.135 Several other
courts have followed the IRS position which supports the theory that the
125 See IRM, 42(10)(10).5(4), supra note 92.
126 Id.
127 Canada-U.S. Tax Treaty, art. XXVII, supra note 85.
128 Zale Corp. v. IRS, 481 F. Supp.-486 (D.C. D.C. 1979).
129 Texas Independent Producers Legal Action Ass'n v. IRS, 55 AFTR 2d 85-714 (D.C. Cir.
1984); see also Stephens v. IRS, No. 82-0421 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 1984). The Stephens court treated
any information gathered in an investigation of potential taxpayer liability as return information.
This is a rather expansive view of the statute. Under a Stephens analysis, the information gathering
by a competent authority would most likely fall within the definition of return information, and
would be protected by section 6103.
130 King v. IRS, 688 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1982).
131 Id. at 489.
132 Id at 490. The documents consisted of: a) Two taxpayer protests of IRS agents' audit
reports; b) A transmittal letter and a portion of an audit; c) A form settling for adjustment to the
taxpayer's return and the reasons therefore; d) A form stating a specific taxpayer liability by period
and the amount of the adjustments; e) Two IRS interoffice memoranda on a specified taxpayer; and
f) A letter from the IRS to the taxpayer asking the taxpayer to alter a method of accounting.
133 For the text of Senator Haskell's comment, see supra note 118.
134 King, 688 F.2d at 492.
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Haskell Amendment was intended neither to enhance nor to diminish
access to information under the FOIA, but only to allow release of statis-
tical studies and compilation of data to, inter alia, committees of Con-
gress. 136  These courts rely upon the broad language of section
6103(b)(2)--"any other data received by, or prepared by, or collected by
the Secretary with respect to a taxpayer"-and the neutral commentary
of Senator Haskell131 to withhold documents under the umbrella of re-
turn information.
The Ninth Circuit, however, has a narrower view of the Haskell
Amendment and restricts the scope of confidentiality under section 6103.
Commencing with Long v. IRS 13  in 1979, the Ninth Circuit has held
that return information, properly defined, includes only information that
directly or indirectly identifies a particular taxpayer. 139 This holding is
now embraced explicitly by the D.C. Circuit. 4° Congress responded to
the Ninth Circuit view with an amendment to section 6103 in 1981141 in
order to protect the confidentiality of IRS tax information.1 42 Despite
this amendment, the D.C. Circuit continues to interpret the Haskell
136 Currie v. IRS, 704 F.2d 523 (11th Cir. 1983). In Currie, the taxpayer sought internal
agency memoranda on the scope of the investigation of taxpayer, interviews with witnesses and
confidential informants, information from third parties relating to financial transactions of taxpayer
and IRS staff members notes and work papers. Id. at 531. The Currie court felt that this withheld
material clearly constituted return information as "data collected by the Secretary with respect to a
return." Id. The Court quoted the following remarks of Senator Haskell: "Thus the addition by the
IRS of easily deletable identifying information to the type of statistical study or compilation of data
which, under its current practice, has been subject to disclosure will not prevent disclosure of such a
study or compilation under the newly amended section 6103". 122 CONG. R1c. S24012 (1976). See
White v. IRS, 707 F.2d 897, 901 (6th Cir. 1979); Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 598 F.2d 827, 840-41 (5th
Cir. 1979) (intraagency communication, memoranda of conferences, various sensitive case reports
and testimony of witnesses all constitute return information).
137 See supra notes 118, 136 and accompanying text.
138 Long v. IRS, 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980).
139 Id. at 368.
140 Neufeld v. IRS, 646 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir. 1981). "Thus, we hold, in accordance with the
Ninth Circuit's holding in Long, that return information, properly defined, includes only informa-
tion that directly or indirectly identifies a particular taxpayer, as the Haskell Amendment indicates."
Id. at 665. Accord Moody v. IRS, 654 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Moody v. IRS, 682 F.2d 266 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); Ryan v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms, 715 F.2d 644, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(Wald, J. dissenting).
141 Economic Recovery Tax Act § 701(a), 95 Stat. 340 (1981) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6103
(1982)).
142 The language added by section 701(a) reads as follows:
Nothing in the preceding sentence, or in any other provision of law, shall be construed to
require the disclosure of standards used or to be used for selection of returns for examina-
tion, or data used or to be used determining such standards, if the Secretary determines
that such disclosure will seriously impair assessment, collection, or enforcement under the
Internal Revenue laws.
I.R.C. § 6103(v)(2) (1982).
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Amendment as restricting confidentiality under section 6103.1 The
IRS is aware of the case law dichotomy between the Ninth and Seventh
Circuits, and the Internal Revenue Service Manual (IRM) acknowledges
the differing interpretations among the federal courts of appeals. 144
The next issue to be addressed is whether the information submitted
to the U.S. competent authority falls within the case law interpretation of
return information under either the IRS or Ninth Circuit view. Accord-
ing to one commentator, the statutory definition of return information is
defined broadly enough to include information filed with the competent
authority. 145 The statutory definition, however, is subject to differing in-
terpretations. Using the King'" and IRS analysis, the type of informa-
tion submitted to the competent authority would probably not be subject
to disclosure to a third party FOIA requester for two reasons. First, the
information submitted fits the statutory definition of "information col-
lected by the Secretary"147 and, second, the information is not a statisti-
cal compilation which may be released under the current IRS
interpretation of the Haskell Amendment. 148  According to the legisla-
tive history, the Haskell Amendment intended to allow disclosure only of
statistical studies and compilations. 149 Thus, if the information submit-
ted were classified as return information by the IRS pursuant to section
6103(b)(2) and the information did not contain any statistical data, it
could not be disclosed to a third party according to the current IRS
position.
The Ninth and D.C. Circuits' interpretation of the Haskell Amend-
ment, however, may allow disclosure of information submitted to the
U.S. competent authority to a third party. The Internal Revenue Man-
143 Ryan, 715 F.2d at 650. The Court stated that it followed the Neufeld rationale of the
Haskell Amendment, which allows information to be disclosed if identifying information is removed
before disclosure. Id.
144 The IRM states with respect to third party return information:
The meaning of this exclusionary clause (known as the Haskell Amendment) has been the
subject of differing judicial interpretations. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Willam-
ette Indus. v. IRS, 689 F.2d 865 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1052 (1982), has con-
strued the Haskell Amendment as requiring the release of federal tax information to a third
party FOIA requester after the deletion of taxpayer identifying details. The Service's inter-
pretation of the Haskell Amendment, as adopted by the Seventh Circuit in King v. IRS,
688 F.2d. 488 (7th Cir. 1982),is that the Amendment pertains only to statistical studies and
other amalgamated compilations of data the disclosure of which would not directly or
indirectly identify a particular taxpayer.
INTERNAL REVENUE MANuAL (13)52(2).
145 Liebman, Confidentiality of Information in Competent Authority, 5 INT'L TAX J. 442, 444
(1979).
146 King, 488 F.2d at 488.
147 I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2) (1982).
148 See supra note 144.
149 See supra note 118.
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ual, for example, instructs agents, for a Ninth Circuit request involving a
case file not otherwise exempt under the FOIA, to delete all direct or
indirect identifying information to the extent necessary to preclude the
possibility of association with a particular taxpayer. 150 Under the
Ninth'51 or D.C. Circuit' 52 view of section 6103, the information submit-
ted to the U.S. competent authority may be released to an unrelated third
party pursuant to a FOIA request. In general, the narrower view of tax
return information would be more likely to allow release of information
in competent authority files.
If the FOIA request does not originate in the Ninth or D.C. Cir-
cuits, the information in competent authority files would probably be
protected under the more expansive view of section 6103(b)(2). One of
the most exhaustive treatments of what constitutes return information
under the current IRS position is contained in Chamberlain v. Kurtz."3
In Chamberlain, the Fifth Circuit had to determine which of sixty-three
disputed documents were considered return information. Forty-two of
the documents included various interagency memoranda analyzing and
discussing Chamberlain's tax liability, several summaries of the case and
letters between IRS officials.' 54 The Court summarily held that all the
materials collected by the IRS were return information and that the in-
teragency memoranda were part of the deliberative process155 exemption
from the FOIA. The Chamberlain court interpreted return information
broadly. Presumably under a Chamberlain-type analysis, the material
submitted to the competent authority and the interoffice memoranda
concerning competent authority would be protected from disclosure to
an unrelated third party.
Due to the conflicting interpretations of section 6103 and the Has-
kell Amendment, and the lack of symmetry among the federal courts of
appeal, it is not apparent that information given to the competent author-
ity or other information relating to the particular taxpayer's case is pro-
tected under section 6103. Even if the IRS determines that materials
submitted to the competent authority are return information, the appli-
cable standard of judicial review of the IRS decision to withhold may
significantly alter the eventual result. Currently, a controversy exists as
150 IRM (13) 52(a) 2, (13 46(3).
151 Williamette Industries, 689 F.2d at 865; Long v. IRS, 54 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) para. 84,5326
(9th Cir. 1984).
152 Ryan, 715 F.2d at 644.
153 Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1979).
154 Id. at 840.
155 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1982) provides that the FOIA does not apply to "inter-agency or
intra-agency memoranda or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an
agency."
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to whether the highly deferential APA standard of review15 6 or the
FOIA standards1 17 apply to IRS decisions to withhold information under
section 6103.
C. Standard of Review of IRS Nondisclosure
If the IRS decides to withhold FOIA-requested competent authority
materials pursuant to a broad reading of section 6103, its decision to
withhold is potentially subject to differing standards of judicial review.
Generally, if section 6103 provides the sole measure of the IRS' duty to
disclose, on judicial review, the claimant has the burden of proving an
abuse of IRS discretion. 158 If the FOIA applies and merely incorporates
the criteria of section 6103 as an exempting statute, on judicial review,
the district court determines the matter de novo 159 with the IRS bearing
the burden of showing that nondisclosure was warranted by one of the
nine specific exemptions listed in section 552(b) of the FOIA.1 °
On its face, section 6103 appears to meet the FOIA exemption three
test because it establishes particular criteria for withholding agency infor-
mation. 161  Under this interpretation the IRS initially determines
whether to withhold information, while the FOIA mandates judicial re-
view procedures of this decision, with the agency bearing the burden of
proof.162 Due to a controversial decision of the District Court of the
District of Columbia in Zale v. IRS,161 the relation of the FOIA and
section 6103 remains unsettled. In Zale, the district court opined that
section 6103 should be the sole standard governing the release of return
information.164 The Zale court ignored the FOIA policy favoring disclo-
sure of agency information and chose to rely on the highly deferential
APA 161 standard in which the claimant has the burden of proving abuse
of discretion and nondisclosure. The Zale court reasoned that the elabo-
156 See supra note 97.
157 See supra notes 103-11 and accompanying text.
158 Linsteadt v. IRS, 729 F.2d 998, 999 (5th Cir. 1984).
159 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982).
160 See supra note 110. See also Linsteadt, 729 F.2d at 999.
161 Exemption three requires that information must be disclosed unless exempted by statute,
and then only if the statute leaves no discretion on the issue, or establishes particular criteria for
withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1982).
162 See supra notes 103-11 and accompanying text.
163 Zale Corp., 481 F. Supp. 486. The Zale decision has been criticized in recent legal writings.
Case Comment, Applying the Freedom of Information Act to Tax Return Information, 69 GEO. L.J.
1283 (1981); Note, Zale Corporation v. Internal Revenue Service: Turmoil In the Disclosure Scheme
for Tax Return Information, 30 CATH. U.L. REv. 675 (1981).
164 Zale Corp., 481 F. Supp. at 487. There were four FOIA requests by the taxpayer which
covered more than 500,000 pages of documents and 350,000 computer cards. Id. The Court, in its
own words, was forced with the reconciliation between FOIA preference for public disclosure of
government information with a necessity for confidentiality in federal tax administration.
165 Zale Corp., 481 F. Supp. at 490. See Linsteadt, 729 F.2d at 1001.
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rate structure of section 6103, including detailed justifications for disclos-
ing highly sensitive and unique information, should take preference over
the generalized structure of the FOIA.166 Thus, the section 6103 stan-
dard of an IRS conclusion that the material constituted return informa-
tion, 167 would survive judicial review unless determined to be an abuse of
discretion.1 68 The Zale interpretation has been adopted by several dis-
trict courts as well as the Seventh Circuit. 169
The opposing view is represented by a 1984 Ninth Circuit case,
Long v. IRS,170 which culminates years of litigation surrounding the re-
lease of Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) data.' 71
In Long, the taxpayer sought computer tapes and other records in con-
nection with the IRS' TCMP.172 The Long court held that section 6103
is reconcilable under the FOIA and qualifies as an exempting statute
under FOIA exemption three. 173 The Ninth Circuit's persuasive ration-
ale was two-fold: 1) prior decisions of the Ninth Circuit held that section
6103 qualifies as a FOIA exemption, 74 and 2) neither section 6103 nor
its legislative history indicates that the section was intended to operate
independently of the FOIA.175 The Ninth Circuit's view in Long main-
tains FOIA procedures for agency determinations of nondisclosure in-
cluding de novo review by a district court 176 with the IRS bearing the
burden of showing that nondisclosure was warranted by exemption three
of the FOIA. 117 Thus, if the IRS chose to withhold competent authority
materials on the grounds of return information, a district court would
166 Zale Corp., 481 F. Supp. at 489.
167 I.R.C. § 6103(b) (1982).
168 Zale Corp., 481 F. Supp. at 490 n.13. See Note, supra note 163, at 676.
169 King, 688 F.2d at 495. Halsey v. IRS, 497 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Green v. IRS,
556 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ind. 1982), affid, 734 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1984); White v. IRS, 707 F.2d 897,
900 (6th Cir. 1983) ("We are disposed to affirm the district Court [refusal to disclose documents] on
the basis of the Zale and King rationale expressed in its decision. . . . Section 6103 we find to be a
detailed and specified statutory scheme which essentially controls the disclosure of tax returns");
Cheek v. IRS, 703 F.2d 271, 272 (7th Cir. 1983) (section 6103 is exclusive as regards the FOIA and
the invocation of section 6103 must be reviewed under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
701 (1982)).
170 Long, 54 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at para. 84,5326.
171 Tax Notes, Nov. 7, 1983 at 515, 516. Susan B. Long, an assistant professor at the School of
Management of Syracuse University, has instituted approximately 13 overlapping lawsuits against
the IRS and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for access to TCMP data and accompanying
documents. The most recent Long case, 54 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at para. 84,5326, is an attempt to
consolidate pending lawsuits and eventually resolve the issue.
172 Long, 54 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 84,5949.
173 Id. at para. 84,5951-2.
174 Williamette Industries 609 F.2d at 867-68; Long v. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 646 F.2d
1310, 1321 (9th Cir. 1981); Long, 596 F.2d at 365-70.
175 Long, 54 A.F.T.R.2d (P-1-I) at 84,5951.
176 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(b) (1982).
177 Long, 54 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 84,5954.
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determine whether there was a sufficient basis for that decision.' 78 In
addition, the FOIA provides that any "segregable" portion of a record
shall be provided to any person requesting such records after deletion of
the portions which are exempt under the FOIA. 7 9 This release of segre-
gable portions' 80 under the FOIA is a foundation for the eventual dis-
semination of competent authority information which is not considered
return information.
VII. RELEASE OF COMPETENT AUTHORITY INFORMATION
To realistically advocate a systematic release of competent authority
determinations, it is necessary to show that 1) the release of competent
authority information is feasible under current case law interpretation of
"return information" without violating U.S. law or a treaty secrecy
clause, and 2) such a disclosure would promote the central tax treaty
policy goal of eliminating the threat of double taxation. The issue to be
resolved in the first problem is whether competent authority rulings
would be granted confidential status under the FOIA and the tax "return
information" umbrella. In order to release portions of a competent au-
thority file pursuant to a FOIA request, two tests must be satisfied: 1)
the materials must not be exempted from disclosure by one of the nine
FOIA exemptions (particularly exemption three),' 8' and 2) the informa-
tion received by the U.S. competent authority must not be completely
protected from disclosure by treaty secrecy provisions. 8 2
The first prong of analysis leads to a discussion of whether compe-
tent authority materials meet the "return information" statutory protec-
tion,18 3 and what standard of review' 84 applies if the IRS refuses to
disclose certain information. Currently, the boundaries of "return infor-
mation" confidentiality hinge on the interpretation of the Haskell
178 Id at para. 84,5955. Under Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 977 (1974), the agency claiming exemption from disclosure of documents under the FOIA
furnishes an index as an aid to the court in determining the validity of the claimed exemption.
Moody, 682 F.2d at 268. Several courts have held that section 6103 does not preempt FOIA proce-
dures. Tigar & Buffone v. Central Intelligence Agency, 47 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) para. 81,576 (D.D.C.
1981) (it is beyond dispute that the court must conduct a de novo review of a decision to withhold
records subject to a FOIA request). Britt v. IRS, 547 F. Supp. 808 (D.D.C. 1982); Moody, 682 F.2d
at 266; Williamette Industries, 689 F.2d at 865; Currie, 704 F.2d 523; Linsteadt, 729 F.2d at 998.
179 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982).
180 The term "reasonably segregable portion" means any portion of the record requested which
is not exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982), and which, after deletion of exempt
material, still conveys meaningful information which is not misleading. Treas. Reg. § 601.701(b)(3)
(1980).
181 See supra note 110.
182 See supra note 90-94 and accompanying text.
183 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
184 See supra note 165-69 and accompanying text.
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Amendment. According to the Ninth and D.C. Circuits view,18 5 the
proper definition of "return information" includes only information that
directly or indirectly identifies a particular taxpayer. This reading is
based solely on the plain language of the statute18 6 and results in a nar-
row definition of "return information." This interpretation is based on
the rationale that "return information" confidentiality is intended pri-
marily to protect the identity of the taxpayer. The legislative history of
section 6103 also indicates that Congress was focusing on protecting tax-
payer identity and information pertaining to that taxpayer's return.1, 7
Under section 6103, the definition of taxpayer identity includes the
"name of the person with respect to whom a return is fled." 1 8
Under this interpretation, which is supported by the plain language
of the statute, legislative history and the Ninth and D.C. Circuits, the
competent authority materials which identify a particular taxpayer, such
as names and addresses,1 89 would constitute "return information" and
could not be released. Additional information submitted by the tax-
payer, such as the description of the business, proposed allocations by the
treaty country, portions of correspondence with the treaty country 90
and the negotiated settlement, would not constitute "return information"
after deletion of identifying details. Once the competent authority mater-
ials fall outside the protection of "return information," these materials
could be released without violating IRC statutory confidentiality.1 91
In the event that the IRS refuses to disclose competent authority
information under section 6103, that decision is subject to judicial re-
view. The applicable standard of review governing FOIA requests for
tax information has been fully discussed in other legal writings. 192 The
185 Wiliamette Industries, 689 F.2d at 867; Long, 54 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at para. 84,5326.
186 The relevant statutory language reads: "But such term (return information) does not in-
clude data in a form which cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a
particular taxpayer." I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2) (1982).
187 "The term 'return information' is to include the following data pertaining to a taxpayer:
his identity, the nature, source or amount of his income. ... S. REP. No. 938 (part I), 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3439, 3748.
188 I.R.C. § 6103(b)(6) (1982). As interpreted by Judge Wald of the D.C. Circuit, this stan-
dard applies whether the taxpayer, in fact, would be identified by the information. Ryan, 751 F.2d at
651 (Wald, J., dissenting).
189 Rev. Proc. 82-29, supra note 15, § 4.04(b).
190 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
191 Section 6103 protects only the statutorily defined "return" and "return information."
I.R.C. § 6103(b)(1), (2) (1982).
192 Case Comment, supra note 163, at 1283; Note, supra note 163 at 697. The Note illuminates
the following counterarguments to the Zale/IRS analysis: unless conflict is demonstrated between
the FOIA and section 6103, section 6103 coexistence is not foreclosed. The author also points out
that the legislative history indicates that the FOIA still applies to "return information" in other
contexts, so it should apply in section 6103(b). In addition, the Haskell Amendment was intended to
neither diminish nor enhance the scope of "return information," so the FOIA still applies to section
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consensus is that section 6103 should not operate independently of the
FOIA because there is no indication in either the FOIA or the IRC that
tax information is afforded special treatment to bypass well-established
FOIA judicial review procedures. 193 The opposing view held by the Sev-
enth Circuit and the IRS relies primarily on the rationale that section
6103 is a detailed statute which should override a general legislative
mechanism such as the FOIA.194 The IRS view has been rejected by the
commentators as an attempt to expand IRC confidentiality in order to
circumvent the FOIA policy of agency disclosure.
195
Under the FOIA standards, the IRS would have the burden of prov-
ing19 6 that competent authority information met one of the nine exemp-
tions, in particular exemption three which focuses on section 6103.
Thus, even if the IRS withheld competent authority information under
section 6103, the FOIA judicial review procedures would require the IRS
to meet a stringent burden of proof as well as release segregable por-
tions197 of the withheld information which is not confidential under the
IRC. Therefore, a combination of a narrow definition of "return infor-
mation," followed by the Ninth and D.C. Circuits with stringent FOIA
judicial review standards, lays the foundation for the proposition that
current case law would support a release of competent authority
materials.
Aside from IRS protection of "return information," competent au-
thority materials submitted to the U.S. competent authority from the
treaty partner are subject to treaty secrecy clauses. 198 This exchange of
information would probably include "specific requests" 19 9 regarding the
taxpayer's business activities in the foreign country, taxes paid, proposed
allocations by the treaty partner and details of the negotiated settlement
between the IRS and the treaty partner. Tax treaties generally provide
6103. Under this analysis, section 6103 and the FOIA are deemed to be in coexistence, with the IRC
defining "return information" and the FOIA controlling appropriate standards of judicial review if
the IRS denies disclosure.
193 Note, supra note 163, at 697-99.
194 Id. at 694.
195 Id at 707-08.
196 See supra notes 176-79. A federal district court may enjoin the IRS from withholding
agency records and order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the re-
questing party. 5 U.S.C. § 522(a)(4)(B) (1982). The district court must review a denial to disclose
de novo, and may examine the contents of the records to determine whether any FOIA exemptions
apply. The FOIA also shifts the burden of proof from the requestor to the agency to sustain its
decision to withhold information.
197 See supra note 180.
198 See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text; see also INsTrruTE ON INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION 325 (15th ed. 1984).
199 Seeman, supra note 87, at 338. Specific requests are one type of exchange of information
between treaty partners.
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that trade or professional secrets 200 must not be disclosed and that other
information received by the competent authority shall be treated in the
same manner as information obtained under the laws of the United
States.201 Therefore, except for trade or professional secrets, information
received by the U.S. competent authority is subject to section 6103 and
the limitations of the Haskell Amendment.2 °2
Under the prevailing analysis of Ninth and D.C. Circuits, the infor-
mation submitted to the U.S. competent authority which constitutes "re-
turn information" such as names, addresses and taxpayer identification
number,20 3 would be protected as confidential information under section
6103. Additional information which does not identify a particular tax-
payer, such as the structure of business transactions, proposed alloca-
tions by a treaty partner,2° and the terms of the negotiated settlement,
would not be confidential under section 6103. In this regard, much of
the exchanged information is subject to domestic law and the prescribed
limits of confidential treatment in that contracting state.20 5 As a result,
the Ninth and D.C. Circuits' view of return information could well pre-
vent competent authority materials from a foreign country from attain-
ing confidential status under U.S. tax law, thereby increasing the
possibility of disclosure.
The next issue is whether a competent authority release would pro-
mote the articulated U.S. tax treaty policy, that is:
[A] maximum degree of international tax harmonization, the reduction
of tax-based barriers to the free movement of goods, persons and capi-
tal. . . with appropriate protections against international tax evasion
. . . The essential long range objectives of the tax treaty program are
to eliminate the impediments that double taxation, or the threat, might
pose to the international flow of goods, capital and persons, and to
establish fiscal relations between the U.S. and other nations.20 6
In any release of tax treaty information a conflict would exist be-
200 See supra note 92.
201 Canada-U.S. Tax Treaty, art. XXVII, supra note 85.
202 See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL (25)20(4): Information which is received by the IRS
from a foreign tax authority is subject to secrecy clauses contained in the specific tax treaty. In
general, these secrecy clauses provide that information received by the IRS cannot be disclosed to
any persons other than those (including courts and adminsitrative bodies) concerned with the assess-
ment, collection, enforcement or prosecution with respect to the taxes, which are the subject of the
respective tax treaties. Additionally, to the extent the information relates to the liability or possible
liability for tax of a United States taxpayer or otherwise falls within the definition of return informa-
tion in IRC 6103(b)(2), it is return information subject to the restrictions on disclosure imposed by
IRC 6103 as well as the restrictions contained in the treaty clauses.
203 Rev. Proc. 82-29, § 4.04(b), supra note 15.
204 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
205 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
206 Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 10, at 398, 405.
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tween two central policies: the taxpayer's ability to avoid double taxa-
tion versus maintenance of fiscal relations with treaty partners. The
avoidance of double taxation policy would clearly be promoted by a com-
petent authority release. Such a release would provide the international
tax planner with information on the operative forces underlying tax
treaty administration in much the same manner that IRS administrative
releases guide U.S. taxpayers today.207 In the last decade, a plethora of
tax information has been periodically released which at one time was
considered undisclosable, such as private letter rulings, 20 8 TM's,20 9
AOD's2 10 GCM's21 I and the IRM.212 These administrative releases now
provide the tax practitioner with information on IRS procedure, inter-
pretation and implementation of the tax laws which assist in tax plan-
ning.213 The private letter ruling process, for example, has illuminated
many of the advantages as well as disadvantages of a systematic release
of IRS information to the public. Some of the advantages include the use
of letter rulings as guidance by tax professionals to support a particular
transaction,214 additional evidence in litigation, a research tool 215 and an
interpretive guide to the current IRS position.216
Similarly, a competent authority determination release would intro-
duce an element of certainty into international tax planning by revealing
the actions of treaty partners with respect to a particular transaction.21 7
At present, there exists no body of tax information which highlights the
administrative actions of both treaty partners with regard to a particular
transaction.218 If the international tax planner perceives similarities be-
207 Portney, supra note 5, at 754. "Our Tax System is unique in providing a readily accessible
well-developed system of advance guidance to taxpayers." Ia
208 See supra note 5.
209 See supra note 8.
210 See supra note 7.
211 See supra note 6.
212 See supra note 11.
213 The IRM, together with the IRS' Statement of Procedural Rules, revenue procedures, reve-
nue rulings, temporary, proposed and final regulations as well as private letter rulings, sets forth the
IRS construction and administration of the tax code. Parnell, supra note 11, at 687.
214 Holden & Novey, supra note 5, at 338.
215 Legal Times, Oct. 8, 1984, at 6, col. 3.
216 Holden & Novey, supra note 5, at 340.
217 Id. at 337, 345.
218 There are sporadic releases of information on foreign transactions involving treaty partners
such as private letter rulings, GCMs and case law, but there is no centralized release on treaty
partner actions. See U.S. Activities of Foreigners and Tax Treaties, 37 TAx LAW. 1045 (1984). Pri-
vate Letter Ruling 8339036 states in part:
On November 9, 1982, Corporation A requested the assistance of the United States Com-
petent Authority in interpreting Article VII(2), Article II(l)(c), and Article VII(l) of the
Tax Treaty with respect to the first and second 1974 dividends and the 1975 dividend.
Whether any progress can be made with Country X tax authorities is doubtful ....
Priv. Rul. 8339036 (June 28, 1983).
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tween a competent authority release situation and his/her own, the inter-
national tax planner may structure the transaction to avoid a potential
conflict. By possessing some ability to anticipate a response by certain
treaty partners to particular transactions, the international tax planner
may lower the degree of risk attached to double taxation and costly ad-
ministrative remedies. Eventually, a body of competent authority would
emerge, allowing the international tax planner to study past actions of
treaty partners as a guide to future conduct.2 19 As the risk is lowered,
the ability of persons and capital to move to foreign markets without tax
impediments is increased, furthering tax treaty goals.
The argument against a competent authority release focuses on the
potential alienation of a tax treaty partner if the United States discloses
treaty information. In examining the U.S. Model Treaty, 220 however, the
treaty partner may be unjustifiably relying upon the breadth of the tax
treaty secrecy provisions. 221 Except for trade or business secrets which
are specifically mentioned in the treaty, information submitted to the
U.S. competent authority is subject to the secrecy law of the United
States, which is, in this case, codified in section 6103 of the IRC.222
Under the current view of return information in section 6103223 and
FOIA judicial review, 2  a variety of IRS agency information is now reg-
ularly published and available to the public.225  The treaty country,
therefore, should be aware of the liberal disclosure provisions in U.S.
law, especially in the FOIA,226 and allow the dissemination of informa-
tion. The Canada-U.S. tax treaty, for example, provides that the ex-
change of information should not be construed to supply information
which is not obtainable under the laws or in the normal course of tax
administration. 227 This provision highlights the tendency of the tax
treaty to defer to domestic secrecy laws to protect information-section
6103 and the boundaries of tax "return information."
Of course, the proposal creates an additional administrative burden
for the IRS, who will prepare and disseminate the competent authority
information generated by the competent authority. As a comparison, in
the private letter ruling context, much of the criticism surrounding tax
professionals' reliance on the letter rulings as precedent is due to the fact
219 Holden & Novey, supra note 5, at 337, 345.
220 See 1981 Model Treaty, supra note 34.
221 See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
222 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
223 See supra notes 185-97 and accompanying text.
224 See supra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
225 For example, private letter rulings, GCMs, TMs, AODs and IRM. See supra notes 1-9 and
accompanying text.
226 See supra note 21.
227 Canada-United States Tax Treaty, art. XXVII(3)(b), supra note 85, at para. 1317B.
Vol. 17:485
COMPETENT AUTHORITY
that only lower level IRS staff members prepare letter rulings. Upper
level IRS officials are unable to review the letter rulings because of the
high volume of requests, estimated at 6000 per year.228 Accordingly, the
IRS.places a prominent disclaimer on the letter ruling stating that the
ruling may not be used or cited as precedent. 229 In the competent au-
thority situation, however, there are usually under 100 cases resolved an-
nually,230 so the IRS could review and release such information without
a dramatic increase in the expenditure of resources. In addition, the
competent authority is a relatively slow process, averaging about 16
months.23' Therefore, the IRS would not be under the extreme time
pressure apparent in the letter ruling process.232 The IRS burden, then,
would be relatively light compared to the benefit to the international tax
planner, which would be substantial.
Logistically, a variety of competent authority information could be
consolidated into one document which would summarize the case his-
tory, illustrate the respective positions of the treaty partners and reveal
the eventual resolution of the double taxation issue. All identifying infor-
mation, such as names and addresses and any other information which
could indirectly lead to identification of the taxpayer (a unique product
or service), would be deleted to comply with section 6103.233 The sum-
mary document could be prepared by the Foreign Operations Districtz34
or the competent authority staff after a resolution of the issue, and then
released to the public. Eventually, the summary document could be pub-
lished in a loose-leaf service or databank entry to ensure the retrievability
of the information. A typical competent authority release would contain
identification of th double taxation issue, relevant treaty provisions in
dispute, proposed action by the treaty partners and the'negotiated settle-
ment (in proportion rather than actual figures). In this manner, the tax-
payer's confidentiality is respected, the international tax planner is
assisted in tax treaty implementation and the threat of double taxation is
appreciably reduced.
228 Portney, supra note 5, at 755. Legal Times, supra note 215, at 6.
229 I.R.C. § 6110G)(3) (1982).
230 Goodrich, supra note 23, at 112.
231 .1d
232 Legal Times, supra note 215, at 6.
233 I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2) (1982).
234 See supra note 35.

